ing continued interpretation by legislatures, parties, the judiciary, and even the elec torate.7 These intergovernmental conflicts continued even during periods when the same party ruled the majority of regions and maintained an absolute majority in the governing lower house of parliament (the chamber of deputies or congreso).
Intergovernmental conflicts continued even as the party brokers who managed the national legislative process retained their capacity to shape the political careers of their copartisans. Why does Spain's experience diverge so apparently from the pre dictions of the Rikerian framework? To answer this question, arguments about the power of party organization have to be questioned fundamentally.
Challenging

Party Organization Arguments
When applied to a broader set of experiences, party organization arguments fail to explain some aspects of change in the degree, pace, and structure of decentraliza tion, especially in cases of increased decentralization with centralized party systems.
First, change in party system structures has been too slow or too shallow to explain significant shifts in intergovernmental policy responsibilities and resources over time and across different cases.8 Second, these explanations rely on a one-dimensional understanding of interests as partisan and not territorial.9 Governors and mayors have interests emanating from the offices they hold and not just the parties they rep resent. These interests are most obvious when regional presidents, such as those in Catalonia and the Basque Country, claim to represent "nations." Yet territorial inter ests are also apparent in nonnationalist regions such as Asturias, whose leadership has sought to reverse the area's industrial decline under different party governments regionally and nationally.10 Party system structures are not irrelevant, but they are insufficient to explain decentralization.
Party organization
arguments focus too much on the mechanisms of shaping decentralization in the legislative arena, and they ignore other foci of political con flict that determine decentralization. These limitations are apparent in countries that initiated their decentralization processes at the same time as their democratic transi tions. Simultaneous, dual transitions produced two fundamental tensions that explain the divergence in party system structure and decentralization outcomes: the simul taneity of democratization and decentralization produced countervailing logics in favor of both party system concentration and decentralization of the state, and democratization provided new political spaces for subnational interests to demand reforms in the state structure after transitions (and their founding constitutions) were initiated and established. These conditions are common in third wave democracies where decentralization of the state has continued even as party systems struggle toward greater centralization under the exigencies of implementing reform.11
Spain demonstrates that a political order with a decentralizing state and central ized and disciplined national parties will still allow subnational interests to influence public policy either through the articulation of policy differences within the national parties or through intergovernmental conflicts in which subnational executives repre sent territorial interests vis-?-vis the national government. Where the discipline of national parties is particularly robust, and the capacity of subnational partisans to represent their region's interests in parliament is weak, the weight of representing subnational interests will shift disproportionately to intergovernmental conflicts and away from intraparty conflicts. Riker's central claim that the political structure of government is more influential than administrative structure in shaping the degree of decentralization needs to be reevaluated. The continued decentralization of the administrative structure can have a dynamic at least partially independent from the political structure. This dynamic is based on intergovernmental conflicts between subnational executives and national governments, that is, in an arena of political conflict and cooperation not wholly within the purview of parties and legislatures but legitimated and necessitated by the political logic of a simultaneously decentralizing democracy.
Spain illustrates the most prominent ways in which the Rikerian framework fails to explain the degree, pace, and type of decentralization.
The logic governing the consolidation of national democratic institutions diverged from the logic governing the recomposition of the Spanish state as a federal administration. Yet as an explanation for decentralization party differences seem to matter little. Table 3, 
As reported in
